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“Writing a Name in the Sky”:
Rancie`re, Cavell, and the Possibility of Egalitarian Inscription
ALETTA J. NORVAL University of Essex
Democratic theory is often portrayed as torn between two moments: that of disruption of rule, andthe ordinary, ongoing institutionalization of politics. This dualism also marks contemporarydemocratic theory. In Jacques Rancie`re’s theory of politics it takes the form of an emphasis on
the ruptural qualities of the staging of novel democratic demands and the reconfiguration of the space
of political argument. The reconfiguration of existing political imaginaries depends upon a moment of
inscription, which remains underdeveloped in Rancie`re’s work. Arguing that the possibility of inscription
is indeed thematized in Rancie`re’s more historical writings, but is often ignored by commentators, this
article seeks to draw out the implications of a focus on inscription for democratic theory and practice.
To flesh out this account, the article draws on Cavell’s writings on exemplarity and the role of exemplars
in fostering both critical reflection and the imagination of alternatives. The focus on such exemplars and
an aversive, nonconformist ethos together facilitate a better understanding of what is required for such
novel demands to be acknowledged and inscribed into democratic life.
Commenting on recent events in Egypt, AhmedBadawi described in his blog how one year ago,“street children flocked to Tahrir and other ma-
jor squares in Egypt and threw their lot in with
the revolutionaries.” He argues that they felt, perhaps
for the first time in their lives, “a sense of comrade-
ship” with the more affluent youth and “found vehicles
to vent their anger at a society that had routinely ig-
nored them and, particularly, a police force that had
abused them and treated them as animals and crimi-
nals.” Through staging their protests on Tahrir Square,
they became part of the “common cause uniting all
Egyptians.”1 Political life today is replete with erup-
tions of popular protests, which seek to make visi-
ble a range of injustices, both familiar and unfamiliar.
Whether it is the “Arab Spring” or more local struggles
for equality—one need only think here of the ongoing
contestation of the demands for same-sexmarriages2—
such struggles foreground deeply felt senses of wrong,
thrusting them into visibility. In originary moments
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such as these, new identities and ways of life that were
once invisible and excluded may be “ushered onto the
threshold of justice” (Honig 2009, 47). But, as Honig
argues, and as we know from experience, there are no
guarantees here. These events bring home to us in a
particularly forceful manner the difficulty, as well as
the high costs, associated with “getting things onto the
political agenda.”
Such struggles articulate specific claims and de-
mands, while they also invoke alternatives to the exist-
ing order. In doing so, they seek to project and inscribe
new and unheard-of ways of being and acting, beyond
the currently acceptable political languages and norms
of our times, onto the political agenda. In this arti-
cle, I explore this idea of “writing a name in the sky”
by engaging with two theorists—Jacques Rancie`re and
Stanley Cavell—who both address issues relating to the
processes throughwhich challenges to existing political
languages and imaginaries are enacted.3 These theo-
rists each offer distinctive insights into different aspects
of these processes. I focus in particular on one key as-
pect, namely that of the transition from the initial artic-
ulation of democratic demands to their inscription onto
a horizon that would allow for their flourishing and ex-
tension to other areas of social and political life.4 This
movement captures an important set of issues facing
our societies today, while also reflecting wider debates
3 The concept “imaginary” designates a space of representation,
which has the function of representing the unity of society in moder-
nity, in the absence of aGod-given order (Lefort 1986). Laclau (1990)
suggests that a collective political imaginary acts as a horizon on
which a multiplicity of demands can be inscribed. Horizons make
possible and limit what may appear as relevant subjects and objects
of politics. Examples of political imaginaries include, for instance,
“the free market,” “the welfare state,” and “Kemalism.”
4 The notion of inscription is drawn fromDerrida’s reading of speech
act theory, and it denotes the idea that meaning is constituted, partly,
by reference to the specific context in which it is “inscribed” (Derrida
1988). Here I deploy the term in a similar sense in order to indicate
both the fact that the meaning of any political demand is shaped by
the context in which it is inscribed and the fact that novel demands
require inscription into wider political imaginaries if they are to
become effectively institutionalized.
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in political theory about the dualism between founding
moments and processes of institutionalization.5 Con-
temporary societies in transition to democracy, as well
as societies in the process of deepening democratic
political participation, are faced with the challenge of
responding to and harnessing democratic energy, in-
sight, and imagination without, however, immediately
subordinating this vitality to the potentially deaden-
ing weight of procedures, rules, and institutions. Given
these concerns, we need to give attention to precisely
how extant systems are affected by the articulation of
novel and often challenging demands; what processes
contribute to and enable the inscription of demands
onto the wider political agenda so that the existing
political order is altered as a result; and what sort of
political ethos is needed to enable such processes to
develop in a democratic direction. I turn to the writ-
ings of Rancie`re and Cavell to think through what is
required practically as well as theoretically if we are
to respond imaginatively to democratic demands and
if we are to learn from and harness the critical insights
arising from such demands in the service of deepening
democracy.
Two scenarios may be used to frame the issues I
seek to address here. These will be familiar to read-
ers of Rancie`re and Cavell, and they resonate with
contemporary political events and struggles. The first
relates an ancient event, as told and retold byLivy anda
host of others, of the secession of the Roman plebeians
on the Aventine Hill. The second is a commentary on
Nora’s position in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House. On the face
of it, these scenarios are very different. Yet, I shall ar-
gue, they share an important set of concerns arising in
democratic theory today. By juxtaposing and bringing
these scenarios and thinkers into conversationwith one
another, we can enrich our understanding of contem-
porary debates concerning the relation between the
expression of new demands and their articulation into
the political life of a community, and of the role of
a democratic ethos and political imagination in these
processes.
SCENARIO 1
In Disagreement Rancie`re (1999) draws on Pierre-
Simon Ballanche’s writings recounting the tale told by
Livy of the secession of the Roman plebeians on the
Aventine Hill. The plebeians seceded—literally with-
drew from the city—as a result of the harsh rule of
Appius Claudius (Parmele 2006, 44). In response, the
patricians conceded someof their demands and created
the offices of the plebeian tribunes. For Rancie`re, the
significance of this retelling of the tale is that Ballanche
notes Livy’s inability “to think of the event as anything
other than a revolt, an uprising caused by poverty and
anger and sparking a power play devoid of allmeaning”
(1999, 23). Livy fails to be able to supply themeaning of
the conflict because he does not put it in the right con-
text, that of “a quarrel over the issue of speech itself.”
5 For a recent treatment of this issue in the work of Weber, Schmitt,
and Arendt, see Kalyvas (2008).
Rancie`re (1999, 23) suggests that Ballanche effectively
restages the conflict as one in which the “entire issue at
stake involves finding out whether there exists a com-
mon stage where plebeians and patricians can debate
anything.” In Ballanche’s view, the relation between
plebeians and patricians is structured through patrician
domination, which holds that those beings deprived of
logos—the plebeians—are not capable of speech; they
are beings of no ac/count, capable only of noise, of
a sort of “lowing.”6 Not unlike those participating in
the Arab Spring, the plebeians faced with this situa-
tion establish another order—another division of the
sensible—by setting themselves up as speaking beings,
“sharing the same properties as those who deny them”
the ability to speak (Rancie`re 1999, 24). They do so
by engaging in a number of speech acts “that mimic
those of the patricians.” Ballanche’s rendering of this
tale makes visible that what is going on is the “staging
of a nonexistent right” (Rancie`re 1999, 25).
When the Senate’s emissary, Menenius, delivers his
apologia to the plebs, stating the necessary inequality
between the patricians and the plebeians, the plebs are
already equals, for they can understand it and, indeed,
after listening politely, respond in kind by asking for
a treaty.7 As a result, the Roman Senate concludes
that “since the plebs have become creatures of speech,
there is nothing left to do but to talk to them” (1999,
26). Hence, they are successful in making the transition
from interruption to inscription. I shall argue, however,
that Rancie`re’s analysis here moves far too quickly. He
fails to explore the Roman Senate’s response to the
plebeians. Accounting for the role of responsiveness in
bringing about change to the extant order is crucial,
and stands at the heart of Cavell’s work, and of his
reading of A Doll’s House.
SCENARIO 2
The second scenario is taken from Cavell’s discussion
of Ibsen’s A Doll’s House and seeks to capture the
difficulty of expressing senses of injustice that do not fit
the parameters of current moral and political discourse
6 Rancie`re suggests that politics concerns a distinction between those
who have speech (logos) and those who do not. Possession of speech
as logos is exclusive to human beings and allows distinctions to be
made betweenwhat is just andwhat is unjust. Having speech signifies
enrolment in the city (Rancie`re 1999, 23). Those who lack speech
are capable only of “noise” (phoˆneˆ). As he puts it, “the difference
is marked precisely in the logos that separates the discursive articu-
lation of a grievance from the phonic articulation of a groan” (1999,
2).
7 Menenius Agrippa delivers his apologia in the form of the fable of
the Belly and its Members (Patterson 1991, 4). The fable recounts
the attempt made by the members of the body (the hands, eyes, ears,
feet, and tongue) to conspire against the belly, which they thought
devoured the fruits of their labour. Patterson notes that the fable
articulates in symbolic terms “some of the most intransigent prob-
lems in political philosophy and practice” relating to the relation
between ruler and ruled, with “the image of the human body and
its nutritional needs as a symbol of the distribution of wealth in the
body politic.” This fable, she argues, has historically been open to
diverging appropriations, not only those reinforcing hierarchy, but
also those making the case of the rebellious members (Patterson
1991, 111–37).
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(Cavell 1990).8 Cavell’s reading is aimed at those peo-
ple within existing democracies, who take themselves
to be “above reproach” in response to the resentment
expressed by members of society who feel aggrieved.9
Hence, in contrast to that offered by Rancie`re, Cavell’s
focus is on those who are in dominant positions, and
more particularly on the question of their responsive-
ness to, as well as acknowledgment of, the expression of
senses of wrong by others. In the play, Nora struggles to
express her sense of injustice to Torvald, her husband
of eight years. When challenged by him as to why she
secretly borrowed money and then skimped on house-
hold expenses to repay interest, she emphasizes the fact
that although she knows that most people would agree
with him, and that he has “warrant for it in books,” she
cannot “be satisfied any longer with what most people
say, and with what’s in books.” She must have the op-
portunity to think things out for herself, an opportunity
she has thus far been denied. In this, Cavell (1990, 110)
suggests, Nora feels herself representative “beyond her
personal resentment,” thus drawing attention to thou-
sands of women like her. Torvald, in turn, questions
her moral sense, and accuses her of “talking like a
child,” like one who does not understand the world she
lives in, thus depriving her, again, of a voice (Cavell
1990, 109). When, at the climax of the story, Torvald
tells Nora that he forgives her—instead of begging her
forgiveness—Nora leaves him. In so doing she enacts
change; she can no longer live in an order that denies
her a voice, her voice and more, the voice of thousands
like her. Through the example of Nora, Cavell captures
the experience of a sense of injustice that is inexpress-
ible in the terms of prevailing discourse, but where, as
he puts it, misery is clearly unmistakable (1990, 112).
And the question arises: What does one make of such
an experience in a context governed by a democratic
grammar? What role does responsiveness, or the lack
of it represented by Torvald, play here?
What is at stake for Rancie`re and Cavell in each
of these cases is the possibility of speaking and of
being heard, even though they deal in different fash-
ions with the processes and consequences of the acts
through which something that was previously excluded
is made visible. Rancie`re tends to refrain from explic-
itly engaging with the issues that arise after moments
of rupture, when previously excluded senses of wrong
become visible and alternative ways of doing things
need to become institutionalized, and thus inscribed
into the current order. This refusal arises from his
much remarked upon division between “politics” and
8 As Cavell (1990, xxxviii) puts it, “What if there is a cry of justice
that expresses a sense not of having lost out in an unequal yet fair
struggle, but of having from the start been left out.”
9 This argument is developed contra Rawls who, Cavell suggests,
“in effect claims that my sense of living in a society which in my
judgement exhibits a favourable degree of partial compliance is one
which, in response to an expression of resentment levelled by an
aggrieved member (permanent or impermanent, I believe) of that
society, I can say my conduct is above reproach (422). (What ‘in
effect’ means here is critical. Rawls does not explicitly claim what I
find him implicitly to claim here;” Cavell 2004, 171).
the “police order,”10 as well as the ruptural picture of
democracy that accompanies this distinction. Cavell,
on the other hand, focuses overtly on questions of re-
sponsiveness, a focus that is crucial if one is to elucidate
fully, not only the transition from disruption to inscrip-
tion, but also the character of practices of inscription.
What stance, for instance, would facilitate a democratic
form of inscription, rather than a mere incorporation
of demands?11 What role does a democratic ethos play
here? Despite the differences between these thinkers,
I shall suggest that what they share is sufficient to draw
them together into a conversation that is potentially
mutually enriching. My key claim then is that Rancie`re
does not do enough by way of addressing questions re-
garding the processes through which democratic chal-
lenges find a foothold in existing orders. Given this, a
turn to Cavell may be fruitful, for he offers a picture
of democratic responsiveness that thematizes precisely
those processes. Without addressing the interconnec-
tions between the interruption of an existing order by
novel demands and their inscription into and change
to that order, I shall argue, any account of democratic
rupture remains fundamentally flawed.
In both of these scenarios, there are subjects who are
to a greater or lesser extent excluded from the extant
order, with the result that their claims cannot be heard
as claims (at leastnot yet).12 Yet their actions,Ballanche
suggests, consist of “writing a name in the sky” in that
they open up new ways of being and acting. How does
“writing a name in the sky” facilitate carving out a place
in the community of speaking beings, which does not
10 Rancie`re’s use of the term “police” should be understood in rela-
tion to two sets of doctrine—the “reason of state” and the “theory of
the police”—arising with the formation of modern European nation
states (Foucault 1988; Habermas 1992, 30). Foucault (1988, 74) notes
that the former refers to attempts to “define how the principles and
methods of state government differed . . . from the way God gov-
erned the world, the father his family or a superior his community,”
whereas the latter refers to “a governmental technology peculiar to
the state.” Hence, here “police” is not understood as an institution
functioning within the state. Rather, it concerns the observation and
regulation of all dimensions of life, amongst them morals, health,
public safety, labor, and population. Thus, “the police” covers “the
whole new field in which centralized and administrative power can
intervene” (Foucault 1988, 80). It was encapsulated in the emer-
gence of Polizeiwissenschaft—which incorporated the public law, ad-
ministration, public health, urban planning—in the first half of the
eighteenth century in Germany. For a historical overview of the
emergence of the reason of state, see Viroli (1992); for a discussion
of the emergence of the theory of the police, see Foucault (2007).
11 The relevant contrast here is between the cooptation of demands
(mere incorporation) and an ethos that takes seriously the idea that
new demands, if taken on board, require a reworking of the extant
order. Rancie`re’s worry is that the extant order will always be able
to incorporate new demands. Cavell’s writing addresses this issue
through the emphasis on responsiveness. Hence, I shall argue, a
democratic form of responsiveness is one that works through the
consequences for an extant order of new demands, and places a
premium on the responsibility to respond, rather than turn away,
simply justify the existing ordering of affairs, or attempt to render
powerless and make ineffective, new demands.
12 This covers many facets of the issue that are not discussed here,
including the question of what is required in terms of knowledge,
leadership, and processes of formation of collective identities. Here
I am concerned less with these general processes than with what
is required in a democratic order to enable it to engage with and
respond to such demands.
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yet exist? In this process of carving out a new space in
which something or someone may appear, what is the
relationship between speech and that which exceeds
speech, insofar as it involves an emphasis on seeing and
on staging? What view of subjectivity and of political
community does this presuppose?
In seeking to address these questions, I shall suggest
thatRancie`re’s characterizationof democracy is caught
on the horns of a familiar dilemma, which needs to be
resolved if convincing answers to these questions are to
be provided. In a nutshell, the problem is this. On one
hand, democracy is presented as ruptural, as a moment
of break from the prevailing order. On the other hand,
the democratic experience must be able to intervene
in and reconfigure that order, which is possible only if
it does not take the form of a rupture or a complete
break. This much is made clear by the plebeian case. I
shall argue that the resolution of this dilemma lies not
in a choice between the two horns, but more in what,
in Wittgensteinian fashion, one may call an attempt
to dissolve the problem through a careful reconsidera-
tion of Rancie`re’s conceptions of political subjectivity,
political community, and, with them, his conceptual-
ization of the possibilities and mechanisms of political
change. My discussion of these conceptions allows me
to attend to the reasons for Rancie`re’s refusal to flesh
out these mechanisms. Making these reasons visible is
not, however, sufficient. Further reflection is needed
on their place in Rancie`re’s writings. In contrast to
familiar interpretations of Rancie`re that present him
as a theorist of rupture who is able only to “momentar-
ily expose the injustice at the heart of rule” (Markell
2006, 3), this article makes the case that there are ne-
glected resources inRancie`re’s writings that offer some
means of addressing the practices of inscription, which
would allow expressions of wrong and novel demands
to reshape the existing political order. Arguing that
the ruptural version rests too heavily on a reading of
only a limited number of his more explicitly theoretical
writings, this article suggests that his historical writings
offer rich resources for understanding how these prac-
tices operate. Drawing out these insights and reflecting
on the work that historical examples do in his writings,
it reorients discussion to focus on the role of exemplars
in bridging the gap between interruption and inscrip-
tion.Here historical examples play an important role in
making available alternatives with which one can iden-
tify and which could act as “catalysts of conversion,” as
Tocqueville put it (Frank 2011, 386). To flesh out these
insights further, I turn to Cavell, whose perfectionist
rendering of exemplarity, with its link to an aversive
ethos,13 furnishes us with a way to address some of
the remaining shortcomings ofRancie`re’s account. The
13 The term“aversive ethos” is drawn fromCavell’s reading ofEmer-
son (Cavell 1990, 33–63). It emphasizes the role of oppositional think-
ing in developing a critique of the present state of things, which calls
for a transformation of that order and of the self. An aversive ethos
is thus closely linked to perfectionism for Cavell, because becoming
“averse” to conformity means we need to transform ourselves, aspir-
ing to a better state of self and of society. For an analysis of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an exemplar of an
aversive ethos, see Norval (2007).
turn to ethos is controversial fromaRancie`rian point of
view. Nevertheless, the way it is elaborated in Cavell’s
writings not only addresses the concerns that he ex-
presses, but also makes available additional resources
to extend and deepen the reach of Rancie`re’s insights
into ongoing democratic practices of contestation.
Rather than treating these two theorists as engaged
in fundamentally divergent enterprises, this article sug-
gests that they could both be argued to contribute to
thought that seeks to bridge the division between rup-
ture and inscription that is characteristic of so much
democratic theory. Democratic theory is torn between
two moments: that of the extraordinary, the moment
of founding and of constituent power, and that of the
ordinary, the institutional and constituted power. The
extraordinary/ordinary couple echoes other forms in
which this dichotomy—between revolutionary found-
ing acts and institutional politics—has appeared both in
theorizing democracy and in thinking about the nature
and character of politics more generally (Laclau 2005;
Markell 2006). I think here of the work of constitu-
tional scholars such as Ackerman (1991), who empha-
sizes the need for popular participation in moments
of constitutional innovation, as well as of attempts to
reflect upon the conundrums posed by demands for
transitional justice and the refounding of states, not ex
nihilo, but in the aftermath of sometimes protracted
conflicts. In each of these cases, different aspects of the
problem of instituting and maintaining a democratic
order are emphasized.
The significance of the interpretation proposed here
is that it suggests that instead of concentrating on the
horns of the dilemma, a different way of approaching
the matter is needed. Rather than remaining fixated
on either side of the dichotomy, we need to look at the
processes and mechanisms that are available to us for
bridging the division. Such a shift may allow us to see
the problem in a different way, thus disclosing aspects
of it that may allow us to dissolve it.14 The figure of
“writing a name in the sky”—projecting and inscribing
new and unheard-of ways of being and acting onto
existing political imaginaries—captures and condenses
what is at stake here. It shifts our gaze onto the mecha-
nisms through which senses of wrong are inscribed into
existing political languages such that they are reconfig-
ured as a result, and to the conditions for doing so. The
writings of Rancie`re and Cavell, when read together,
offer a nuanced and novel way of thinking about such
mechanisms and practices. Hence, Kalyvas (2008, 4) is
correct to suggest that we need to rework the dual-
ism between the extraordinary and the ordinary, and
appropriate the extraordinary in order to expand the
scope of democratic experience, retaining the energies,
freedom, and imagination that are associated with acts
of founding. What this reading of Rancie`re and Cavell
offers is a vision of how this may be done.
14 In this, I follow aWittgensteinian strategy of reading.Wittgenstein
argues that in approaching the problems of philosophy, rather than
solving them, we need to dissolve them. I take this to mean that
we need to approach problems in such a manner that new aspects
become visible, and older ones dissolve.
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DEMOCRACY, VISIBILITY,
AND THE STAGING OF WRONGS
Rancie`re’s view of “democratic life” seeks to distance
itself from what is problematic, if not downright ob-
jectionable, in discourses on democracy, both historical
and contemporary (2006). These include discourses ex-
pressing hatred of democracy, as well as various forms
of critique that acknowledge democracy but seek to
confine it within certain limits (Rancie`re 2006, 2).15
Contemporary expressions of hatred against democ-
racy, he argues, do not call for more “real” democracy;
nor do they complain about the institutions embodying
the power of the people. Rather, in these discourses
the problem is located in “democratic civilization” it-
self: Excess is what ruins democracy and hence is what
must be controlled by it.16 The image of democracy as
associated with an excess that stands in need of being
governed is one that goes back to Plato and it embodies
what, for Rancie`re, is the very (improper) principle of
politics itself.17 Democratic excess, he argues, is simply
“the dissolving of any standard by which nature could
give its law to communitarian artifice via the relations
of authority that structure the social body”; it is gov-
ernment based on nothing other than the “absence of
every title to govern.” Rancie`re (2006, 4647) puts it
thus:
[T]he only remaining title is the anarchic title, the title
specific to those who have no more title for governing
than they have for being governed. This is what of all things
democracymeans.Democracy is not a type of constitution,
nor a form of society. The power of the people is not that
of a people gathered together, of the majority, or of the
working class. It is simply the power peculiar to those who
have no more entitlements to govern than to submit.
In the absence of the power of birth and of wealth,
what remains is the power of the people, which is the
power of “anyone at all, the equality of capabilities to
occupy the position of governors and of the governed.”
Hence, democracy is marked by the fact that it rests on
the absence of a foundation.
Rancie`re fleshes out his understanding of this ab-
sence of foundation that characterizes the beginning of
15 Rancie`re notes that hatred of democracy is as old as democracy
itself. In Ancient Greece the term was one of insult, signifying the
government of the multitude that would ruin any legitimate order
(Rancie`re 2006, 2). In our contemporary world, hatred of democracy
is often expressed by spokespersons living in democracies. Rancie`re
(2006, 7–8) lists a number of recent writings on democracy, including
the Trilateral Commission Report—The Crisis of Democracy—as ex-
emplifying the paradox of democracy: “as a social and political form
of life, democracy is the reign of excess. This excess signifies the ruin
of democratic government and must therefore be repressed by it.”
16 Rancie`re (2006, 7–8) notes that the historical remedy for this sort
of excess consisted in redirecting “feverish energy activated on the
public stage towards other ends” often, as is today also the case,
toward the search for material prosperity.
17 It should be noted that Rancie`re’s “return to the classics” is not
one that seeks to affirm the Aristotelian idea that politics is based
on a natural disposition to political life. Rather, it is a return that
seeks to show that democracy, already in the classical texts, marks
the place of those who have no specific properties allowing them to
govern.
politics in terms of a division of the sensible.18 The in-
stitution of democracy takes place with the creation of
a space “made of disconnected places” (Rancie`re 2006,
46–47), a new topography that redistributes places and
reconfigures what is visible and invisible, what can be
seen and heard and what cannot be seen and heard.
Politics, in this view, is a matter of aesthetics first and
foremost, in the sense in that it concerns the division
between the perceptible and the imperceptible. The
logic of the police—the extant order—distributes bod-
ies within the space of visibility; it is challenged by
political acts that shift bodies from the places assigned
to them, thus making visible “what had no business
being seen.” Political activity here takes a particular
form. It is concerned with “conflict over the existence
of a common stage and over the existence and status
of those present on it. It must first be established that
the stage exists for the use of an interlocutor who can’t
see it and who can’t see if for good reason because it
doesn’t exist” (1999, 26–27). The plebs on theAventine
Hill and the Tahrir protesters must first establish their
right to be counted as parties to the dispute, and they
do so through the declaration of a wrong. Rancie`re
(1999, 27) thus argues that
Parties do not exist prior to the conflict they name and in
which they are counted as parties. . . . Politics exists because
those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings
make themselves of some account, setting up a community
by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing
more than this very confrontation.
On this reading democracy does not concern itself with
questions of institutional design or a particular “human
disposition” that would characterize it. It excludes ac-
tivities of representation, as well as any concern with
regimes or forms of government.19 In contrast, democ-
racy concerns
the system of forms of subjectification through which any
order of distribution of bodies into functions correspond-
ing to their “nature” and places corresponding to their
functions is undermined, thrown back on its contingency.
(Rancie`re 1999, 101, emphasis added)
This partition takes place through the articulation of
a wrong.20 A wrong is a “mode of subjectification in
18 Rancie`re (2009a, 277) suggests that the “distribution of the sensi-
ble” establishes a link between “being in a specific space and time,
performing specific activities, and being endowed with capacities of
seeing, saying, and doing that ‘fit’ those activities.”
19 Rancie`re suggests that we should not think of representation as
a mechanism or system invented to compensate for the growth of
populations, nor as a form of adaptation of democracy to vast spaces
and modern times. Like Tully, Rancie`re (2006, 53) notes that the
assimilation of democracy to representative government is a recent
phenomenon, and one that has been used by elites to exercise power
de facto. The term democracy, Tully (2008a, 155–56) argues, came
to be associated with “representative democracy” only in the late
eighteenth century.”
20 I use the term articulation here in its theoretical sense, as devel-
oped by Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 113). In contrast to mediation,
it is a process that binds together elements or objects that have no
natural or necessary belonging together.
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which the assertion of equality takes its political shape”
(Rancie`re 1999, 39). The protestors in Tahrir Square
and the plebs on the Aventine Hill stage such a wrong
by conducting themselves like beings with names, as
equals to thosewhohavepreviously dominated them.21
The staging of a wrong and the verification of equality
take effect through attempts to refashion and chal-
lenge the existing division of the sensible. They oc-
cur rarely (1999, 17) and do not “express” pregiven,
objective interests. “Speaking out,” Rancie`re suggests,
is not “awareness and expression of a self asserting
what belongs to it” (1999, 37). Rather, it is a process of
disidentification, removal from a “natural” place (1999,
36).
It is also through this process that political bonds are
created. Political bonds, Rancie`re suggests, are not cre-
ated by identification with a victim or his or her cause,
but as a result of disidentification from the dominant
terms or available subject positions. As a result, po-
litical community is not based upon having something
positive in common, but rather is a sharing of “what
is not given as being in-common,” ties that “bind the
given to what is not given” (1999, 138–39). On this
reading, democracy as a political mode of subjectifica-
tion has three distinguishing characteristics. First, it is
a kind of community that is defined by the appearance
of the people, such that it reconfigures the regime of
the visible. Second, this space is occupied by a people
of a particular kind: It is a unity that superimposes
the effectiveness of a part of those that have no part,
“floating subjects that deregulate all representation of
places and portions” (1999, 99–100). Third, the place
where the people appear is a place where a dispute is
conducted. Hence its ruptural quality.22
RANCI `ERE: A THEORIST OF RUPTURE?
Despite the crucial insights Rancie`re offers, there are
serious questions to be raised about this character-
ization of democracy. Numerous critics have voiced
their concern over what variously has been called
Rancie`re’s “non-political” understanding of politics
(Dillon 2003), the too sharp division posed between
politics and the police order, and his emphasis on the
21 His understanding of equality and its verification is of crucial
importance because it distinguishes a political from a nonpolitical
wrong (Rancie`re 1999, 39).
22 As Rancie`re (1995, 49) puts it, “Democracy is the community of
sharing, in both senses of the term: a membership in a single world
which can only be expressed in adversarial terms, and a coming
together which can only occur in conflict. To postulate a world of
shared meaning is always transgressive.” In the sentence preceding
this quotation, Rancie`re emphasizes the role of rupture and even
of violence: “In order to uphold one’s correctness other kinds of
arguments have always been needed. The affirmation of the right
to be correct is dependent on the violence of its inscription. Thus,
the reasonable arguments of the strikers of 1833 were audible, their
demonstration visible, only because the events of 1830, recalling
those of 1789, had torn them from the nether world of inarticulate
sounds and ensconced themby a contingent forced-entry in theworld
of meaning and visibility. The repetition of egalitarian words is a
repetition of that forced-entry, which is why the space of shared
meaning it opens up is not a space of consensus.”
spontaneous and interruptive quality of democracy. As
the foregoing suggests, there is indeed a deeply in-
grained view of democracy as disruption. In this sense,
Rancie`re’s work echoes that of other recent theorists
of democracy. Laclau, for instance, in his later writ-
ings increasingly emphasizes the disruptive quality of
politics and of democracy, while denigrating concerns
with institutionalization as nonpolitical, the adminis-
tration of things.23 A similar position is articulated by
Wolin (2004, 603), who contrasts themoment of experi-
ence of democracy—“a crystallized response to deeply
felt grievances or needs”—to governing understood as
“manning and accommodating to bureaucratized insti-
tutions” that are inherently “anti-democratic.” More
recently still, analogous arguments have been devel-
oped by Zˇizˇek (2011), who argues that “the name of
the ultimate enemy today is not capitalism, empire, ex-
ploitation or anything of the kind, but democracy: It is
the ‘democratic illusion’, the acceptance of democratic
mechanisms as the only legitimate means of change,
which prevents a genuine transformation in capital-
ist relations.”24 Such accounts raise serious questions,
not simply about the narrow conceptions that are of-
ten associated with the term “democracy,” but more
importantly, regarding how much we can say of and
about democracy other than emphasizing its disruptive
qualities.25
Readings of Rancie`re that emphasize the ruptural
qualities of his writings, however, often do so at the
expense of ignoring the points in his writings where he
distances himself from the revolutionary fervor associ-
ated with interruptive characterizations. For instance,
Rancie`re (1999, 100) is critical of Lefort’s portrayal
of modern democracy as occupying the empty space
of power precisely on this point, arguing that Lefort’s
work is too closely associated with “a theatre of sacri-
fice that originally ties the emergence of democracy
to the great specters of the reembodiments staged
by terrorism and the totalitarianism of a body torn
asunder.”26 He is similarly at pains to argue that democ-
racy is not about setting up a counterpower, a pure
site where it exists in isolation from the police. This is
suggestive of a more nuanced analysis of democracy
that can be teased out from a discussion of Rancie`re’s
more historical work, but that needs further deepening
and development.
With this inmind, let us turn to two ofRancie`re’s key
examples: the secession of the plebs on the Aventine
23 Like other political theorists in this respect, Laclau’s work is also
marked by ambiguity. His work on hegemony suggests something
quite different: not a ruptural view of politics, but one of a war of
position in the Gramscian sense.
24 For a nuanced reading of Zˇizˇek’s rendering of democracy that
situates his critique in the context of his writings, see Dean (2005).
25 Markell (2006) explores a similar set of questions with regard to
Arendt.
26 Lefort (1989, 304) argues that “Power appears as an empty place
and those who exercise it as mere mortals who occupy it only tem-
porarily or who could install themselves in it only by force or cun-
ning.” Rancie`re (2003, para. 13) also further suggests, contra Lefort,
that it is not productive to think of politics in terms of a structural
void.
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Hill and a revolt of Scythian slaves as recounted by
Herodotus. These examples share an emphasis on stag-
ing in struggles to verify equality.27 Only the former,
however, demonstrates a movement that goes beyond
mere interruption. In the case of the Scythian slaves,
what initially appears to be a successful demonstration
of equality turns out to be of limited effect (Rancie`re
1999, 12–13). After nearly three decades away battling
the Medes, a Scythian army returned home, only to be
confronted by a generation of sons, sprung from their
own wives and fathered by their slaves. Determined
to oppose the army, the slaves started to act as if they
were the equals of thewarriors. They built trenches and
armed themselves in readiness to defend the territory.
Initial attempts to reconquer the slaves by force of arms
failed; but the warriors then asserted their claim to
superiority bearing only horsewhips. This, Herodotus
suggests, made the slaves feel that they were, indeed,
slaves and not the warriors’ equals (Rancie`re 1999, 12).
What the slaves failed to dowas to turn awar-generated
achievement of equality into political freedom. They
did not succeed in inscribing their sense of wrong onto
the political horizon, in challenging the existing order-
ing of hierarchies.
In the case of the Aventine plebs, in contrast, a re-
configuration of the sensible does occur. A successful
displacement of “natural” relations is the result of a
combination of elements, consisting of the use ofwords,
of argument, poetics, props, and the inventionof names.
The Aventine plebs do so by engaging in a number of
speech acts, mimicking those of the patricians:
[T]hey pronounce imprecations and apotheoses; they del-
egate one of their number to go and consult their oracles;
they give themselves representatives by rebaptizing them
. . . Through transgression, they find that they too . . . are
endowed with speech that does not simply express want,
suffering or rage, but intelligence. They write, Ballanche
tells us, “a name in the sky”: a place in the symbolic order
of the community of speaking beings. (Rancie`re 1999, 24–
25)
Through their speech acts they bring into being new
positions of speaking and acting. The plebs declare
themselves to have standingwith the patricians, writing
a name in the sky: opening up new worlds, inventing a
future that does not (yet) exist.28
27 Rancie`re (1999, 88) maintains, politics is a matter of “interpreting,
in the theatrical sense of the word, the gap between a place where the
demos exists and a place where it does not . . . Politics consist in in-
terpreting this relationship, which means first setting it up as theatre,
inventing the argument, in the double logical and dramatic sense of
the term, connecting the unconnected.” As several commentators
have noted, “the artifice of the theatrical scene shares with politics
the displacement of ‘natural’ relations between bodies and places”
(Ross 2009, 128; see also Hallward 2006, 113).
28 The question of opening up new worlds has recently begun to
receive systematic treatment (Kompridis 2006). For an insightful
rendering of the opening up of new spaces of imagination in feminist
politics, see Zerilli (2005), who draws onArendt to develop her argu-
ment. See also Frank’s reading (2009) of Frederick Douglas’ staging
of dissensus, and Schaap’s exploration (2009) of the Aboriginal tent
embassy in Australia.
Rancie`re is not alone in his emphasis on the impor-
tance of the displacement of the existing division of the
sensible and the need to open up new worlds. This is a
familiar theme in which the writings of Heidegger and
Arendt, in particular, loom large.29 Honig’s (1993, 93)
reading of Arendt focuses, for instance, on promising
as an action that is unconditioned, that brings some-
thing new into being. However, she notes that the
sharp division between extraordinary action and the
ordinary means that this investigation of promising
leaves Arendt “unable to account for how promising
works.” Zerilli (2005) also draws on Arendt to think
through the exigencies of the emergence of the newand
its inscription in feminist political imaginaries. Others
suggest that the invention of the new is something we
should associate with social critics and social move-
ments whose activities could challenge and alter exist-
ing frameworks of deliberation (Bohman 1996, 140).30
Drawing on Heidegger, Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus
(1997) also suggest that we come to see things differ-
ently as a result of activities that bring into the open and
articulate experiences that “force recognition.”31 They
characterize these activities as “disclosing skills.”32 All
of these analyses of forms of world disclosure, of com-
ing to see things anew, emphasize that such practices
do not rely exclusively on objective measures (e.g.,
measuring inequality), on knowledge, and on reason-
giving. Even though these may form part of the pro-
cess, it is important that the emphasis on coming to
view things differently is maintained. This is also the
case for Rancie`re. As we have seen earlier, for him the
possibility of engendering a new reality is not, in the
first instance, an objective process. It is, rather, sub-
jective in that it emphasizes the importance of seeing
things differently.33 As he puts it with reference to his
29 Kompridis (2006, 188), drawing on Heidegger’s treatment of dis-
closure as a practice that facilitates a new beginning, argues that
Heidegger’s analysis suffers from two problems, both of which are
relevant to our understanding of change and agency. First, he “failed
to connect the normativity of disclosure with the normativity of in-
tersubjectivity”; and second, he aligns disclosure too closely to truth.
30 For Tully (2008b, 308), Gandhi is such an exemplar, as his “ordi-
nary, civic and glocal life continues to move millions of people to
begin to act.”
31 As Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (1997, 81) put it, “Discovering
that a good friend, a trusted colleague, or a family member is gay
brings about the necessary change more surely than any argument
about abstract rights.”
32 This includes activities such as constituting organizations that pro-
duce clarity on an issue; uncovering a disharmony as a disparity
worthy of investigation; determining that the practice that the dis-
parity reveals permeates many domains of life; cross-appropriating
practices with people in other disclosive spaces so that they become
sensitive to the problem and respond to it in their own domain;
proposing a social change in the light of what one is seeing anew;
and talking with people who are specialists in making legal changes
(Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus 1997, 94).
33 Wittgenstein’s work on aspect dawning is relevant here. The dawn-
ing of an aspect involves seeing something differently. Wittgenstein
(1989, 46) argues with respect to the interpretation of dreams that
“When a dream is interpreted we might say that it is fitted into a
context in which it ceases to be puzzling. In a sense the dreamer
redreams his dream in surroundings such that its aspect changes. . . .
and the result is that we say: ‘Ah, now I see why it is like that, how it
all comes to be arranged in that way, and what these various bits are
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discussion of workers in the nineteenth century, it is
the framing of a new common sense that allows new
forms of political subjectification to be implemented.
This process, and the world that is to come into
being, has a paradoxical status. It involves a delicate
negotiation of the old and the new, between the extant
order and an egalitarian inscription. In his example
of striking workers in nineteenth-century France, for
instance, Rancie`re emphasizes that egalitarian inscrip-
tion is dependent upon the police order and must take
its resources, at least in part, from it.AsRancie`re (2011,
6) puts it elsewhere, politics “does not stem fromaplace
outside of the police. . . . There is no place outside of the
police.”34 Given this, the key question is the one with
which I started, namely, how precisely does one explain
the movement from interruption to inscription, and
what resources does Rancie`re offer us in this respect?
As I have suggested, in his historical writings, as well
as in his writings on aesthetics and politics, there are
numerous pointers.His portrayal of staging as amaking
visible of previously unheard-of claims and demands,
of naming, and his emphasis on speech acts mimicking
dominant orders present someavenues for exploration.
To bring the precise contours of the issue into focus we
need to recall the link between egalitarian inscription
and his understanding of political subjectivity, which
foregrounds processes of subjectification and disiden-
tification, and explore whether disidentification is able
to do the work he needs it to do. Is a distancing from
an extant order sufficient to open up the possibility of
“writing a name in the sky”? If not, what else is needed?
DISIDENTIFICATION AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF EGALITARIAN INSCRIPTION
Rancie`re, we have seen, suggests that disidentification
from the places and subject positions offered by the
police is what opens up the possibility of creating po-
litical bonds and imagining alternative worlds. Here is
the conundrum. New positions of identification (sub-
jectification) have to be produced purely by negative
means, through a process of disidentification. These
suggestions are clearly not entirely implausible. In this
respect, we might note Rancie`re’s example of the bod-
ies of Algerians thrown into the Seine by the French
police in October 1961 during the time of the Algerian
war. He argues that around those bodies “a political
bond was effectively created, made up not of identifi-
cation with the victims or even with their cause but of a
disidentification in relation to the ‘French’ subject who
. . .’ and so on.” Likewise, in Rancie`re, the emphasis on (re)staging
plays the role of reconfiguring what he calls the order of the sensible,
what appears and what can appear to us.
34 If, as Rancie`re notes, there are conflicting ways of dealing with
the places that the police order allocates, if there are indeed are
better and worse police orders, then we need to interrogate the
conditions that would make these distinctions possible. Although
Rancie`re (1999, 31) does gesture in this direction with the statement
that the better one is “the one that all the breaking and entering per-
petrated by egalitarian logic has most often jolted out of its ‘natural’
logic,” he argues immediately afterward that if “the police is sweet
and kind” it does not make it any less the opposite of politics.
massacred them.” He goes on to say that such politics
is the “art of warped deductions and mixed identities”
constructing local and singular cases of universality.
The singularity of the wrong, for Rancie`re, must always
be distinguished from the “particularization of right
attributed to collectivities according to their identity”
(1999, 139). But one has to ask why this emphasis on
disidentification and a problematization of identifica-
tion?Andwhat are the consequences of this emphasis?
The problem here arises from Rancie`re’s associa-
tion of identification with the positions of the extant
order, the natural places and hierarchies offered by
the police order. For instance, for him rights are not
egalitarian inscriptions, but positions that are occupied
by subjects within the given order, and they stand
in stark contrast to the miscount of the democratic
community. Although much of Rancie`re’s (1999, 138)
critique of discourses of right and of the political lim-
itations of compassion and good will might well be
correct, these criticisms do not suffice to address the
difficulties of a negative identification or disidentifi-
cation as the basis of an egalitarian inscription. Is an
exclusive emphasis on disruptive identification—a pol-
itics of negation—sufficient to Rancie`re’s account of
politics? Could it provide anything other than bonds of
a fleeting character?35 We have seen previously that it
is plausible that under certain circumstances a rejection
of an order could act as a powerful binding force. This is
so particularly under conditions of severe dislocation.
But whether the politics of rejection, negation, and
disruption are effective in the making of alternative
worlds, in the reconfiguration of the sensible, is another
matter altogether.
Itmay be useful here to turn to another ofRancie`re’s
examples, namely the trial of the revolutionary Au-
guste Blanqui in 1832, where there is a clearer ex-
plication of the intertwining of the old and the new,
which is necessary if we are to conceptualize a recon-
figuration of the sensible. Asked by a magistrate to
give his profession, Blanqui responds, “proletarian.”
The magistrate replies that it is not a profession, to
which Blanqui retorts that it is the profession of thirty
million Frenchmen “who live off their labor and who
are deprived of political rights” (Rancie`re 1999, 37).
The judge then allows “proletarian” to be added to the
court’s list of professions. Rancie`re (1999, 38–39), in
his analysis of this event, argues that everything turns
on the acceptance of a double word, “profession”:
For the prosecutor, embodying police logic, profession
means job, trade: the activity that puts a body in its place
and function. . . . But within revolutionary politics, Blanqui
gives the same word a different meaning: a profession is
a profession of faith, a declaration of a membership of a
collective.
This collective,Rancie`re continues, is not a social group
but is part of a process of subjectification: “Proletarian”
subjectification defines a subject of wrong, the counting
35 Rancie`re (1999, 40) himself does not think this necessarily poses
a problem.
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of theuncounted.This clearly is an exampleof aprocess
establishing a relation between two worlds.
Yet it is not clear that subjectification here involves
disidentification. Blanqui rearticulates what it means
to be a proletarian and a member of a profession and
the judge’s response here is not dissimilar to that of the
patricians who come to hear the words of the plebs as
logos rather than phoˆneˆ. This does not, however, rest
upon a process of disidentification. Moreover, it is also
clear that for the termproletariat to become a term that
opens up newworlds, much else has to occur. Although
this is in part amatter of the specific history and destiny
of the term proletariat, the more general question here
concerns the import of the inscription of an egalitarian
logic. Rancie`re (1999, 40) acknowledges that such in-
scriptions might be fragile and fleeting. However, his
acknowledgment could be read in two different ways.
One could argue, as Rancie`re repeatedly does, that
what matters is the specific miscount. As he puts it
(2011, 9): “All my historical research has been aimed at
. . . showing that the history of social emancipation had
always been made out of small narratives, particular
speech acts, etc.” Even so, Rancie`re does seek to offer
an account of democracy and egalitarian inscription
that exceeds the local and the specific miscount, and
that provides tools to think critically about democracy
beyond the confines of the local and the present. Here
lies its strength.
However, if the verification of equality is to take the
form of an inscription that resignifies the sensible, then
it has to have the power to reconfigure. This means
that it has to be potentially more than fleeting if rein-
scription is to have any significance at all. In this light,
it is clear that disidentification is not sufficient to the
task. We have seen that although it does play a crucial
role in opening up newworlds, the very figuring of such
new worlds, of alternative possibilities, requires more.
The opening up of new worlds presupposes a char-
acterization of subjectification that focuses not only
on disidentification, but also on the possibility of rei-
dentifying with an alternative vision. In contrast to his
theoretical writings, Rancie`re is remarkably clear on
this in his earlier historical studies. For instance, in The
Nights of Labor, significantly subtitled The Workers’
Dream in Nineteenth-century France, he argues (1989,
20) that
It is the secret of others that the worker needs to define the
meaning of his own life and struggle. Not the “secret of the
commodity” . . . It is not knowledge of exploitation that
the worker needs in order “to stand tall in the face of that
which is ready to devour him.” What he lacks and needs is
a knowledge of self that reveals to him a being dedicated
to something else besides exploitation, a revelation that
comes circuitously by way of the secret of others: that
is, those intellectuals and bourgeois people with whom
they will later say, and we in turn will repeat, they want to
have nothing to do—and especially not with any distinction
between the good ones and the bad ones.
Rancie`re continues his analysis, suggesting that the
world of the bourgeoisie divides into two: “those who
live a vegetative existence, the rich people so persis-
tently depicted as stretched out indolently on their
sofas or feather beds” and those, by contrast, “who
desert the domestic cult of Baal to set out in search of
the unknown: the inventors, the poets, the lovers of the
people and the Republic, the organizers of the cities of
the future, and the apostles of new religions” (1989, 20).
The worker, he argues, needs all these people, “not to
gain scientific or scholarly knowledge of his condition,
but to entertain and maintain his passions and desires
for another world” (1989, 20, emphasis added). Hence,
the possibility of entertaining andmaintaining passions
and desires for another world arises not simply from
disidentification, but from “revelation of a different
world and the initiation of a new kind of relationship
between beings,” fromother possibilities becoming vis-
ible (1989, 116).
In terms of the initiation of new relationships be-
tween political subjects, Rancie`re argues repeatedly
that a democratic community must be both a com-
munity of “interruptions” and one in which “intervals
constructed between identities, between spaces and
places” inaugurate a political “being-together” as “a
being-between: between identities, between worlds”
(1989, 137).36 However, there is a gap between dis-
courses of disidentification, which often take the form
of discourses of purity, and the institution and main-
tenance of complex new forms of identification capa-
ble of sustaining an ethos of egalitarian inscription.
Addressing this gap between disidentification and the
possibility of reidentificationwith anotherway of doing
things necessitates a reworking of Rancie`re’s use of
the category of identification. I have already noted his
association of identification with the extant order, the
natural places and hierarchies offered by the police. If,
however, this conflation of a theoretical categorywith a
particular politics is questioned, it becomes possible to
provide a much more nuanced explication of processes
both of disidentification (turning away from) and of
reidentification (turning toward), neither of which can
be presumed to take a specific, predetermined political
form.37 That is, nothing, in itself, follows from iden-
tification as such. All depends on the precise forms
of identification and the possibilities opened up or
closed down by particular identifications. Significantly
it also allows one to address a persistent criticism of
Rancie`re’s work, namely the presumed homogeneity
of the police order. If attention is directed, as Rancie`re
himself argues, to the specificity and singularity of spe-
cific forms of identification, it becomes much more
problematic to assume that there is one wholly hege-
monic form of identification that dominates the police
order and from which there is no escape. This issue is
36 “The democratic process is the process of perpetually bringing
into play, of invention of forms of subjectivation, and of cases of
verification that counteract the perpetual privatization of public
life. Democracy really means, in this sense, the impurity of politics”
(Rancie`re 2006, 62).
37 Conceptually I would argue that “disidentification” remains a
form of identification, albeit one with a negative basis. In this case,
it makes sense to deploy the broader category of identification as
involving both an aspect of distancing oneself from another and of
drawing on alternatives to produce novel subject positions.
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absolutely central, because without it no reconfigura-
tion of the sensible is possible. To put it in different
terms: a reconfiguration of the sensible requires, of
necessity, the possibility of altering and initiating new
relations between beings, and that cannot occur so long
as one holds onto the idea of an undifferentiated police
order. Let us now turn to an examination of the ques-
tion of ethos, which addresses, precisely, the relational
dispositions between people.
THE ROLE OF EXEMPLARS IN
EGALITARIAN INSCRIPTION
I take the characterization of the plebian revolt by Bal-
lanche to foreground the world disclosive character of
staging equality. As Rancie`re himself puts it, “politics
is both argument and opening up the world where ar-
gument can be received and have an impact” (1999,
56), bringing about a different way of seeing things:
Political invention operates in acts that are at once argu-
mentative and poetic, shows of strength that open again
and again, as often as necessary, worlds in which such acts
of community are acts of community. That is why the “po-
etic” is not opposed here to argument. (1999, 59)
Hence, the question is how he conceives of this impact?
What must be shifted in order for a dispute to reconfig-
ure the regime of the sensible? I wish to focus on one
particular candidate, namely the possibility that such
an impact may be felt or conceived through a shift in
ethos. That is, the writing of names in the sky, if they
are to have an impact, will have to have a wider effect,
a reconfiguring effect, and this can be thought through
the instatement of a different ethos.
However, Rancie`re consistently objects to a range
of possible candidates for this task, arguing that they
all fall prey to the order of the police. He objects
to the idea that democracy has anything at all to do
with a way of being.38 Ethos, he argues, signifies an
abode, a place or location and ethics; it means that
one interprets a sphere of experience as the exercise
of a property or a faculty possessed in common by
all those who belong to a location. But this precisely
is where Rancie`re locates the problem, because the
purported commonality of properties such as logos is
always already divided.39 Hence, he argues that politics
as a set of practices should not be regulated by “ethics
conceived as the instance pronouncing values or prin-
ciples of action in general” (2011, 4). In contrast, the
egalitarian inscription is conceived of as a break with
an ethos, as a distancing from it.
38 “It is not their ethos, their ‘way of being,’ that disposes individuals
to democracy but a break with this ethos, the gap experienced be-
tween the capability of speaking and any ‘ethical’ harmony of doing,
being, and saying” (1999, 101).
39 As he puts it (2009b, 4): “As is well known, it soon is made ap-
parent that this common property is not shared by everyone; there
are human beings who are not entirely human beings. For instance,
Aristotle says, the slaves have the aisthesis of language (the passive
capacity of understanding words), but they don’t have the hexis of
language (the active power of stating and discussing what is just or
unjust).”
Is there a way to conceive of egalitarian inscription
that would do the work of disruption and distancing
that Rancie`re has in mind, but that would also, further,
be capable of inscribing such distancing into a way of
being, an ethos, yet in a manner that would not by
definition fall prey to the order of the police? From the
foregoing it is clear that the work of such an inscription
should be conceived along a series of strictly specified
lines. First, it should conceive of political subjectivity
in a manner that avoids a given and pure conception
of identity in favor of a critical subjectification. Second,
it should facilitate the possibility of opening up new
worlds. This means that it should be futural in charac-
ter (Rancie`re 1999, 50): It should allow political actors
to “write names in the sky”—to imagine unthought-
of possibilities. Third, it should conceive of political
community, not in substantive terms, but in terms that
are attentive to the inevitable closures necessarily ac-
companying any police order. Taken together, these
specifications resonate strongly with a certain contem-
porary understanding of a democratic ethos, developed
in thework of Cavell, conceived of as an aversive ethos,
an ethos that is precisely not that of a location or a
place, but of an aversion to it. In what follows, I turn
to a discussion of the features of such an ethos, arguing
that it is capable of providing uswith themeans to think
through crucial aspects of “writing a name in the sky”
that remain underemphasized in Rancie`re’s writings.
I will focus in particular on the role of the exemplar
in constituting a horizon of possibilities, one that ad-
umbrates a conception of democratic subjectivity that
foregrounds (critical) responsiveness, thus highlighting
the placing of demands on the moral order (or the
police order, to put it in Rancie`re’s terms).
To amplify this point, let us return again to the work
done by Rancie`re’s examples: Auguste Blanqui, the
revolt of the plebs on the Aventine Hill, the disidenti-
fication from a certain “French subject” that occurred
in the wake of the Algerian war. Most commentators
on Rancie`re’s work focus on the disruptive character
of each of these examples. However, as we have seen,
they have a further role that exceeds that of disruption.
Each also acts as an exemplar of the possibility of being
and acting differently. Like the figure of Nora, they em-
body claims exceeding existing moral discourse, they
“put the social order as such on notice” (Cavell 1990,
109), as well as manifesting for us another way of do-
ing things. The protesters in Tahrir Square not only
demanded an extension and deepening of the right to
be heard, but also organized themselves in a manner
that enacted alternative forms of social arrangement.
The much commented-upon organization of teams to
provide childcare and to clean the square signifies at-
tentiveness to the position of women and the need for
social care.40 This is the work of egalitarian inscription:
Opening up a horizon of imagination in which other
ways of conceiving political community are kept alive
40 See, for instance, the reportage in the New York Post, February
12, 2011: “Protesters clean up Tahrir Square, as army pledges civilian
rule.”
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and, importantly, can be (re)inscribed repeatedly.41 On
this reading, reinscription always takes into consider-
ation the precise, local conditions, yet simultaneously
acts as a call to open ourselves up to other, foreign
possibilities manifested in the declaration of a dispute
with the extant order. It is Rancie`re’s attention to the
singular character of these examples that leads com-
mentators to overemphasize the ruptural quality of
democracy in his writings, and thus to miss the wider
significance and power of his historical cases. However,
as Rancie`re suggests, his work may be thought of as
“panecastic philosophy” because it deploys “a method
for finding in every (ekaston) peculiar manifestation”
the “whole (pan) of its power” (2009a, 281). Hence, his
“little narratives” that are extracted from the fabric of
social history, where they are “expressions of a certain
‘workers’culture,’” may become, instead, “statements
on and shifts in the distribution of the sensible” (2009a,
281). The words resound. In doing so, they are con-
crete enunciations. But they also contain a principle
of untimeliness and universalization: “You must also
draw the line of escape, the line of universalization”
(Rancie`re 2009a, 282).
Despite this very clear emphasis on the exemplari-
ness of his examples, Rancie`re refrains from drawing
out a generalizable ethos of engagement. The reason
for this, as I have argued, arises in part from the specific
understanding of ethos as located, signifying a place,
and in part from his conceptualization of subjectivity as
disidentification. Paradoxically, then, he refrains from
thinking through what is required on the side of the
extant order, for the exemplar to do its work of in-
scription. In each of these respects Cavell’s work could
usefully supplement Rancie`re’s writings.
An emphasis on (re)inscription through the work
of the exemplar allows one to retain the importance of
singularity and historicity, while not remaining trapped
in what is merely fleeting, sporadic, fugitive, and
interruptive.42 Thinking about the exemplarity of the
example, enables one to focus on both the distancing
from the given order, a turning away, and the possibility
of another way of being and acting—a turning toward—
that is inscribed in it. This both–and logic helps to
counter the force of much of contemporary democratic
theory, which seeks to resolve dilemmas regarding rup-
ture and institution through an exclusive emphasis on
one or the other.43 In contrast, Cavell’s Nietzschean
rendering of exemplarity captures the double logic that
41 This rendering of inscription relies on insights from Derrida’s
treatment of the possibilities of “grafting” and iteration (Derrida
1988), which emphasizes the complex interaction between change
and repetition, such that every repetition or reinscription contains
both an element of newness, of break with an extant context, and an
element of continuity, which allows it tomake sense, to be intelligible.
42 Melissa Lane (2011) provides a general discussion of the work
of historical exemplars in political theorizing. An excellent range of
contributions dealing with historical forms of exemplarity are also
contained in Gelley (1995).
43 Here I draw on Derrida, who refuses what he regards as the
“blackmail” of either–or arguments, and explores the possibility of
thinking one possibility together with another. As already noted,
either–or forms of argumentation—either complete break or conser-
vative continuity—occur across the spectrum of democratic theory.
is required here. On one hand, it allows for a certain
disidentification (Rancie`re) or aversion (Cavell) to the
given, a critique of conformism that also resonates with
Arendt’s.44 On the other, it keeps open the possibility
of an identification with that which exceeds the current
order through a focus on the demands these exemplars
place upon us; upon everyone, and also upon thosewho
occupy the positions of “the police.”
Inherent in Cavell’s vision of democracy is the goal
of demonstrating to others the partiality of society’s
arrangements, by offering oneself and one’s position
as presenting an alternative self for those others (Ham-
mer 2002, 132–33). An important part of this work of
both making available and keeping open the possibil-
ity of another way of doing things is done by such
exemplars.45 As Conant (2001, 193, emphasis added)
puts it, “To be an exemplar . . . is to be someone whose
way of life . . . places a demand on others to emu-
late his example in a non-imitative fashion.” Hence, an
exemplar provides a concrete representation of some-
thing one aspires to (Conant 2001, 195). Its role is to
unsettle us—provoking disidentification, in Rancie`re’s
terms—and to open up horizons of imagination not
previously available to us. What needs to be shown is
how this rendering of exemplarity could contribute to
our understanding of the development and fostering of
alternative forms of identification and inscription.
Let us now return to Cavell’s exemplars in this con-
text. Nora acts as an exemplar in that she manifests
another way of being, opening up potential new hori-
zons that do not leave things unchanged:Her departure
demands a response at the same time as it stimulates
thinking of imaginative ways to “light out from the
common ways” (Walker, 2001, 175). Cavell (1990, 111)
argues that Nora’s taking off her “fancy clothes” upon
leavingTorvald at the end of the play is an enactment of
inner change. He also argues that howTorvald picks up
the pieces “is as morally fateful for him as Nora’s leav-
ing is for her” (Cavell, 1990, 113). Torvald can, Cavell
notes, persist in his initial view of Nora. That, precisely,
is what disturbs Cavell about the idea that we should
act to ensure that our conduct is “above reproach,”
suggesting as it does a rejection of perfectionism (1990,
113). Cavell andRancie`re both acknowledge that there
However, they also take other forms. Notable examples include what
Foucault called “Enlightenment blackmail”—the idea that one has to
be either for or against Enlightenment—and the dichotomous divi-
sion between power and domination-free communication in Haber-
mas. These older debates continue to have an impact on how we
think of democracy and of possibilities that are more complex than
what the either–or form allows.
44 Cavell’s Emersonian emphasis on aversion clearly resonates with
Arendt’s critique of conformism. Arendt (1994, 744) depicts it thus:
“Morality collapsed into a mere set of mores—manners, customs,
conventions to be changed at will—not with the criminals, but with
ordinary people, who, as long as moral standards were socially ac-
cepted, never dreamt of doubting what they had been taught to
believe in.”
45 Ferrara (2006, 66–67) argues, for instance, that “Alongside the
‘force of things’—of what exists, of habits and traditions—and the
‘force of ideas’—of what should or ought to be the case—stands the
force of the example, which replaces the normativity of a law or
principle with the normativity of the example.”
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are no guarantees here. That is why the political work
of the exemplar is so important.
To break out from the commonway presupposes not
only a sense of dislocation, of dispute and of dissatisfac-
tion, but also theavailabilityof analternative imaginary
horizon, something transcending the here and now, dis-
closing at least the possibility of new worlds. It is here
thatRancie`re’s historical exemplars come into play and
take on their full force. Exemplars “manifest another
way,” are always singular, yet in their singularity they
facilitate the glimpsing of a universal, of another way
of doing things. For Cavell (1990, 59), friendship and
authorship are paradigm cases of exemplars, allowing
us to strive for the next self. He suggests, for instance,
that Plato’s Republic is an obvious candidate to illus-
trate this work of conversation between friends. The
friend, who is also an enemy “contesting my present
attainments” (1990, 59), is
intellectually authoritative because . . . his life is some-
how exemplary or representative of a life the other(s) are
attracted to . . . the self finds that it can turn (convert,
revolutionize itself) and . . . a process of education is un-
dertaken . . . in which each self is drawn on a journey of
assent to . . . a further state of that self, where . . . the higher
is determined not by natural talent but by seeking to know
what you are made of and cultivating the things you are
meant to do; it is a transformation of the self which finds
expression in . . . the imagination of a transformation of
society. (Cavell 1990, 6–7)
Every one of us has the inherent capacities needed for
this process—there is nothing elitist about this argu-
ment. The cultivation of these capacities takes place,
among other things, through the work of exemplars
that are constituted, not given. The “commonalities”
they propose, as Zerilli (1998, 11) puts it, “must be
articulated through the interplay of diverse political
struggles—rather than discovered and then merely fol-
lowed, as one follows a rule.” Thus, exemplars are
products of political struggle: The fact that Nora and
Tahrir square are recognizable to us as exemplars of
struggles against inequality is the result of ongoing po-
litical struggles that have contributed to the sedimenta-
tion and inscription of a certain democratic, egalitarian
ethos.46
TOWARD AN ETHOS APPROPRIATE TO
EGALITARIAN INSCRIPTION
Nevertheless, the work of exemplarity done by Tahrir
Square and Nora is not the same. Perhaps one of the
pivotal contrasts between Ranciere’s and Cavell’s ex-
emplars concerns their respective renderings of subjec-
tivity. Although Rancie`re’s is limited by his emphasis
on disidentification, it has the advantage of explicitly
dealing with collective forms of identification. In con-
trast, Cavell’s focus on the individual is often taken to
46 “Sedimentation,” a geological metaphor, is drawn from Der-
rida’s reading of Husserlian phenomenology. It suggests the process
through which the meaning of a term becomes fixed and its origins
forgotten as a result of a process of layering that occurs over time.
suggest that his writings are somehow nonpolitical, and
commentators are skeptical as to its potential political
import. Shulman (2011), for instance, argues that a fo-
cus on the collective is necessary if we are to develop
a properly political understanding of ethos in general
and an ethos of responsiveness more specifically. He
suggests that a “political form of acknowledgment . . .
requires a compelling counter-narrative that connects
private troubles to public causes,” and he doubts that
Cavell provides this. Others have similarly emphasized
the fragility of the first person plural in Cavell. Ham-
mer (2006, 165) notes that “[t]he ‘we’ in Cavell is a
contested, fragile space of individual human voices that
are exercised without any communal or metaphysical
assurances.” Despite skepticism in this regard, there
is little doubt that Cavell’s focus on conversation, on
“speaking together, about matters of common impor-
tance,” is deeply political (Cavell 2006, 265). The em-
phasis in his writings on politics as claim-making fore-
grounds the task of citizenship as one of making and
staking claims; of working out, together, through these
processes, what we are responsible for, with whom we
are in community (Cavell 1982, 23). Norris (2006, 33)
puts it succinctly: “I don’t have, so to speak, a choice
betweenmyself and others, the individual and the com-
munity. . . . The community both gives me a political
voice, and can take that voice back from me.” Indeed,
Cavell’s elaboration of exemplarity addresses these is-
sues through its focus on the processes involved in the
constitution of claims of the common, what wemay call
“ours” (Zerilli 2005, 170).
The view of exemplarity is sustained by a conception
of subjectivity that starts from the riven character of
every identity and moral order. Rather than focusing
exclusively on the division of the sensible between the
extant order and those excluded, “the part of those
who have no part,” division is thought of as running
through the self and through society, between a given,
attained self or state of society, and a next or future
state of self and society.47 Despite the focus on the self,
it is clear that Cavell breaks decisively with a liberal
understanding of the individual as an isolated self, fully
constituted before he or she enters into any relation
with others. The self, for him, is inherently divided and
doubled; any autonomy is always something to be at-
tained, and if attained, always remains threatened and
precarious (Mulhall 1994, 292–310). Moreover, it is im-
portant that the identity of the self—both attained and
next (futural)—requires “the recognition of an other—
the acknowledgment of a relationship.”48 The emphasis
47 Cavell (1990, 59) notes in this respect that for Emerson “we are
divided not alone between the intellect and sense, for we can say that
each of these halves is itself split.We are halved not only horizontally
but vertically—as that other myth of the original dividing of the
human pictures it—as in Plato’s Symposium, the form of it picked up
in Freud, each of us seeking that of which we were originally half,
with which we were partial.”
48 Cavell (1990, 31) argues that the working out of any identity can
only occur in the context ofmy relations to others: “Emerson’s turn is
tomakemypartiality the sign and incentive ofmy sidingwith the next
or further self, whichmeans siding against my attained perfection (or
conformity), sidings which require the recognition of an other—the
acknowledgement of a relationship—in which this sign is manifest.”
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on relationality, which is necessary to any account of
inscription, is constitutive of the human for Cavell. He
suggests that
Whatever Moral Perfectionism knows as the human indi-
vidual, one who is not everything but is open to the further
self, in oneself and in others, which means holding oneself
in knowledge of the need for change; which means, being
one who lives in promise . . . which in turn means expecting
oneself to be, making oneself intelligible as an inhabitant
now also of a further realm—Kant and Mill, and Nora
Helmer and Tracy Lord in The Philadelphia Story, call this
the realm of the human—and to show oneself prepared
to recognize others as belonging there . . . This is not a
particular moral demand, but the condition of democratic
morality. (Cavell 1990, 125, emphasis added)
Relationality as constitutive of a democratic ethos
avoids the overly individualistic emphasis of which
Cavell is often accused and places the self always al-
ready in relation to others, as well in relation to his or
her society and the demands it places upon him or her.
Bates (2003, 42) argues this point thus:
Hence one must be careful in interpreting the phrase from
Emerson’s “History” that Cavell quotes—the “unattained
but attainable self.” This is not a designation of some spe-
cific state to be reached . . . What perfectionism wants
is the possibility of self-transformation according to an
ideal that is internal to the self’s constitution rather than
one that comes from without. However, we need to re-
member that what is “internal” and what comes from
“without” are themselves not fixed and permanent cat-
egories. If the transfiguration of any particular state of the
self is to be possible, then even these categories will be
capable of transformation. Of course, every part of every
state ofmy self is how I relate to the society that has helped
to form me.
The nonteleological character of the perfectionism
advocated by Cavell (1990, xxxiv) leaves no role for
the idea of a true, or indeed a false self. Hence, the
transfiguration of the self always occurs in response
and in relation to the extant order and it is here that
exemplars play a crucial role.
Aswehave seen, there are two aspects of this process
that are important. The first relates to the process of
distancing oneself from the given order. In Rancie`re,
this work is done through a process of disidentifica-
tion. In Cavell, drawing on Emerson and Nietzsche,
it takes the form of a critique of conformism. Cavell
(1990, 146) argues in this respect that there are two
key aspects shared by his two focal examples of perfec-
tionism, Emerson and Nietzsche: a hatred of moral-
ism/conformity and a disdain for the present state
of things “so complete as to require not merely re-
form, but a transformation of the self.” Politically, con-
formism for him entails a forgetting of the need to
define oneself: “The conformist, by failing to estrange
himself from prevailing opinion (as well as from him-
self), lets the community speak for him, yet without
interrogating its right to do so” (Hammer 2002, 132).
Oppositional, critical thinking, in contrast, consists in
the ability to withstand conformism and to develop
the resources to respond to the inevitable failures of
democracy.49 Here the visibility of alternatives is cru-
cial.
The advantage of Cavell’s emphasis on the critique
of conformism and the making visible of alternatives,
in contrast to Rancie`re’s, is that he explicitly situates
them in relation to the extant (moral) order, as criti-
cism of democracy from within (1990, 56). Let us recall
the case of Nora: Her presence and departure place
a demand upon the moral order, thus thematizing the
issue of responsiveness. As Sparti (2000, 91) suggests,
“our responsibility to others lies in our responsiveness
to them.” Torvald clearly fails to respond to Nora; he
cannot hear her demands. What are the demands that
we cannot hear today? Those expressing a sense of
injustice often find themselves inNora’s position: faced
with a society that cannot even begin to comprehend
the sense of wrong expressed. This is the case today
with a plethora of struggles within societies that regard
themselves as democratic, and as otherwise, “above
reproach.” Here one only needs to think of responses
to demands for same-sex marital unions—branded as
“madness” and as “grotesque”—that echo Torvald in
his unwillingness to engage with Nora and with her
struggle to give voice to her sense of exclusion.50
Responsiveness plays a crucial role in Cavell and it is
precisely what is absent—for structural reasons—from
Rancie`re’s depiction of egalitarian inscription. The too
sharp division between politics and the police order
closes off this possibility for Rancie`re, leading him to
see the matter almost exclusively from the perspective
of the part that has no part. If a democratic politi-
cal community must indeed be conceived of as both a
community of “interruptions” and one in which “in-
tervals constructed between identities, between spaces
and places” inaugurate a political “being-together” as
“a being-between: between identities, betweenworlds”
(Rancie`re 1999, 137), then the consequences of an
egalitarian inscription, also for those who occupy po-
sitions within the extant order, must be contemplated.
Events such as those portrayed in the concrete histor-
ical cases discussed by Rancie`re make us aware of the
painful distance from “perfect justice” in the current
order, as Cavell (1990, 107) puts it, and demand a re-
sponse, an examination and possible revision of the
dominant position, hence provoking engagement with
the claims articulated and disputes declared. Lacking
responsiveness and engagement would be a form of
aspect-blindness, where one is “unable or unwilling
49 Cavell (1990, 56) argues the point thus: “I understand the training
and character and friendship that Emerson requires for democracy
as preparation to withstand not its rigors, but its failures, character
to keep the democratic hope alive in the face of disappointment with
it.” I take this tomean, amongst other things, that we need to respond
to these failures without falling back into cynicism and a crucial part
of this process of keeping democratic hope alive is precisely the very
character of responsiveness, not turning away saying that we stand
“above reproach,” as Rawls suggests.
50 As recently as 4 March 2012, the head of the Scottish Catholic
Church, Cardinal O’Brien, in an article for The Sunday Telegraph,
branded campaigns for same-sex marriage as “madness” and as
“grotesque.”
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to realize the significance of the other’s expressions”
(Hammer 2002, 73).51
These provocations are significant not only for what
they bring about in specific situations, for those mis-
counted, but also for the horizons of imagination they
open up and keep open. Cavell (1990, xxxvi) marks
their significance by arguing that the “demand of one’s
human nature for expression demands the granting of
this human demand to others” and conversely, “show-
ing that at some stage the scoundrel, opting out of
membership in the intelligible realm, must seek to de-
prive others of expression, or their voice in choosing
principles, or say, ideas, of their lives.” From here it
becomes possible to think through the demands of a
politics of responsiveness, conceived of as the ability
and responsibility to respond to the inevitable fail-
ures of democracy. These themes clearly intersect with
contemporary debates on the nature of a democratic
ethos and in particular with the recent turn to ques-
tions of responsiveness and receptivity. Much of this
work focuses on the need to intensify our receptivity
(Kompridis 2006, 209) and develop practices that can
foster agonistic respect and critical responsiveness that
works on the self in its response to others (Coles 1996;
Connolly 1995). As Connolly (1995, xvi) argues, a plu-
ralist culture needs to cultivate such critical responsive-
ness, because “to become something new is tomove the
self-recognition and relational standards of judgment
endorsed by other constituencies to whom you are con-
nected . . . to be white, female, heterosexual . . . is to
participate in a diverse set of collective identifications
. . . To alter your recognition of difference, therefore,
is to revise your own terms of self-recognition as well.”
Debates concerning the centrality of a critical ethos to
democracy can be traced back to the writings of Fou-
cault and Nietzsche on agonism and can be contrasted
with thinkers who either downplay or deny the role
of ethos in developing their respective understandings
of democracy.52 More recent writings on deliberative
democracy have, however, also sought to articulate a
specific ethos commensurate with deliberation. In this
respect Laden (2001, 194) suggests that deliberative
democracy itself must institute an ethos that is suited
to the values of deliberation. Coming close to a Cavell-
inspired position that attention needs to be given to
the practices through which we come to hold particular
dispositions, most of these authors agree that a critical,
responsive ethos is an indispensible part of democratic
practice.
However, positions clearly still diverge on the role of
struggle in such an ethos. Rancie`re foregrounds strug-
51 Cavell comments in this respect upon the case of slave owners,
suggesting that although they see slaves as “a certain kind of human
being” the slave owner denies his internal relation to these peo-
ple. Hammer (2002, 74–75) summarizes what is at stake here in the
following terms: this and other examples demonstrate “the extent
to which we experience something as human depends not on its
physical or mental features, but on our relation to it—the quality of
our reciprocal stance.”
52 Bernstein (1998, 291) argues in this respect that Habermas’ dis-
course theory of law and politics presupposes but does not provide
an explication of a democratic ethos.
gle and confrontation, whereas Cavell’s writings often
emphasize the conversational. Nevertheless, although
the conversational emphasis in Cavell does not occur
at the expense of other practices of “manifesting for
another,”53 the manner in which he conceives of these
practices could be supplemented with a more explicit
consideration of confrontation and struggle. In a com-
mentary on “Homer’s Contest,” Owen (2002, 125) ar-
gues that what is at stake here is a practical form that
the instantiation of this attitude or ethos may take.
He suggests that the agon captures this well, being a
political culture in which “citizens strive to develop
their capacities for self-rule in competition with one
another, a culture that honors exemplary democratic
citizens as setting standards that we should seek to
match and surpass.” To work in this fashion, an ex-
emplar should be an excellence that is “attainable,”
because its educative function depends on its unsettling
us, not on our following it in a slavish fashion (Cavell
1990, 6–7). It is notable that this Nietzschean rendering
of exemplarity echoes John Stuart Mill’s treatment of
“originality,” which he suggests opens our eyes, “which
once fully done” allows one to be original oneself (Co-
nant 2001, 229). These conditions are important be-
cause they make it clear that the educative role of the
exemplar can only be fulfilled if someone or something
is both related, similar to us (exemplarity is a mark
of this), and different from us (exemplariness is an
indicator of inessential difference). Establishing these
similarities and differences, Rancie`re teaches us, comes
about as a result of imaginative engagement in political
struggle, a possibility, as Conant and Cavell point out,
that is open to everyone.
Such standard setting involves attending to the
“rough ground of politics,” including the struggles
in and through which exemplary qualities are devel-
oped (Honig 2011, 203). Emerson makes this all too
clear. The responsiveness required of us is often jar-
ring in character. We need to “affront and reprimand
the smooth mediocrity and the squalid contentment
of the times” (Emerson [1841] 1977, 147). That in-
cludes, for Cavell, confronting and responding to the
inevitable failures of democracy.With this insistence on
the ever-present possibility of the nonresponsiveness of
the extant order, he addresses one of Rancie`re’s key
concerns, and goes beyondmany theorists of the demo-
cratic ethos.54 These possibilities are precisely the well-
springs of Cavell’s construal. Although he shares with
Rancie`re the deep sense that our democracies often
disappoint us, he focuses on the cultivation of an aver-
sive ethos that seeks to prepare us for those failures.
53 For a discussion of the role of “manifesting for another” inCavell’s
writing, see Norval (2011).
54 Cavell’s work allows one to elaborate a conception of a democratic
ethos that goes beyond a focus on the role of critique, and a supple-
ment to relations of antagonism. Its nonteleological perfectionism
facilitates a specification of the grammar of relations between citizen-
subjects that places demands and expectations upon participants in
the democratic game.
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“THERE IS NOTHING LEFT TO DO
BUT TALK TO THEM”
By way of conclusion, let us return to the scenarios
with which we started, making visible the value of an
account of inscription that explicitly foregrounds an
aversive ethos. As I have suggested with the Aventine
example, Rancie`re implicitly highlights what many of
his readers focusing exclusively on his more explicitly
theoretical later writingsmiss, namely, the possibility of
inscription accompanying the declaration of a wrong.
Such inscription involves a range of activities and prac-
tices, including the naming of hitherto unnamed sub-
jects; the reclaiming of a given name; the staging of
a wrong that seeks to reconfigure the sensible, thus
reframing our existing ways of looking at a situation;
the imagination of other possibilities; and seeing the
universal in the singular. At the core of Rancie`re’s
writings, as in Cavell’s, we find “a multitude of indi-
viduals such as Louis Gauny, Joseph Jacotot, Jeanne
Derion” who “by their declarations, their grievances,
and their acts transform the distribution of the sen-
sible” (Rockhill and Watts 2009, 4). In reciting these
names, Rancie`re engages in a double gesture, contest-
ing histories written in the names of great men, as well
as histories of the longue dure´e that “erase the pos-
sibility of acknowledging the actions of anyone what-
ever” (Rockhill and Watts 2009, 4).55 It is an abiding
theme of Cavell’s writings that they similarly draw on
the works of figures whose status as philosophers are
contested. Cavell (1995, 12) argues, for instance, that
it is an important part of his project to reappropriate
Emerson as a philosophical writer, because from this
he could “learn something not only about Emerson,
and not only about American culture, but something
about philosophy, about what makes it painful.” For
both of these thinkers, then, invoking such names plays
an important, critical role. For Rancie`re, as we have
seen, it is important that these are not names of great
men, but of figures hitherto unknown; singular, yet
capturing something of the significance of a moment
of political challenge and change. In Cavell (1990, 58),
the theme of representativeness is also present and is
equally linked to presenting “standards,” yet in such
a way as to emphasize our split nature, between our
existing world and self and what we could become, our
nextness. Blanqui’s remarkable claim to the “profes-
sion” of proletarian, Jeanne Deroin’s equally striking
presentation of herself as a candidate for an election
in which women cannot run: Both stage nonexistent
rights, constructing a singular, polemical universality
(Rancie`re 1999, 42). As Bosteels (2009, 163) puts it,
“the universal exists only in the singular—that is, in the
plurality of particular modes, places, and operations.”
Yet, despite the presence and explicit acknowledg-
ment of exemplarity in Rancie`re’s work,56 his analysis
55 Rockhill and Watts (2009, 4) note that in doing so Rancie`re dis-
tances his work explicitly from the Annales school.
56 Rancie`re (1999, 41) calls Jeanne Deroin’s actions “exemplary.”
For a more extended historical treatment of Deroin, see Scott (1996,
chap. 3).
of Roman patricians’ acceptance of the plebeians’ “be-
coming beings who may very well make promises and
draw up contracts” is brief (1999, 25). He notes that
from “the moment the plebs could understand Mene-
nius’s apologia . . . theywere already, just as necessarily,
equals.” The Roman Senate concludes that “since the
plebs have become creatures of speech, there is nothing
left to do but to talk to them” (Rancie`re, 1999, 25–26).57
This brief gesture, I have argued, covers over precisely
the question of responsiveness and the need, for the
plebeian speech act to become effective, for it to be in-
scribed in the extant order. The responsiveness in ques-
tion here is not predetermined. Yet this does not make
it any less significant. The patricians accepted the stag-
ing of equality by the plebeians; elsewhere, the staging
of equality is less successful. The story of the Scythian
slaves is a case in point; they fail to turn their war-
generated equality into political freedom (Rancie`re
1999, 13). What this contrast foregrounds is that the
gains of struggle need to be defended, beyond their
initial staging. This is necessary, not only in cases of
the instituting moment of democracy, but also in well-
established democratic orders, where we cannot risk
thinking ourselves to be “above reproach.” Part of this
defense consists in cultivating an ethos of aversive re-
sponsiveness. Such an ethos, far from affirming a “way
of being,” alerts us to the necessity to challenge the
“squalid contentment” of our age (Emerson 1977, 147)
on an ongoing basis. It captures the intertwining of
politics and the police order, and shifts the emphasis to
a study of the places where they are inscribed in one
another, allowing us to focus on the specific historical
modalities in which this inscription occurs (Bosteels
2009, 170). This includes, crucially, an emphasis not
only on the perspective of the articulators of a wrong,
but on their addressees, those occupying privileged po-
sitions within the extant order. It requires attention to
historical specificity and singularity, just as it calls for
an emphasis on the politics of claim-making and the
fragile collectivities it brings into being.
I started this reading with the suggestion that
Rancie`re’s view of democracy is torn on the horns of a
dilemma: between democracy as a staging of equality
that interrupts the extant order, and democracy con-
ceived of as an inscription of equality that has the
capacity to relocate and reshape it. As we know from
much democratic theory, there are advantages to both
of these characterizations. In Rancie`re, as in other the-
orists, they lead to radically divergent conceptions of
democratic practice, each of which is accompanied by
an emphasis on different aspects of political commu-
nity. In the case of the former, the emphasis is on the
division between the community and the part of the
community that has no part. It makes visible the neces-
sary exclusions accompanying any instituted order. In
the latter the focus is on the imbrication and redoubling
of names and it is suggestive of the possibilities of not
only staging the miscount, but envisioning alternative
57 Rancie`re (1999, 26) contests Ballanche’s own view that this accep-
tance is matter of a “progressive revelation that can be recognized
by its own signs,” a “determined philosophy,” but leaves it at that.
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ways of doing things. The latter is more evident where
Rancie`re discusses his historical examples. As I have
suggested, this should give us cause to reflect further
on the role and function of such examples. Rancie`re
turned to a detailed examination of the working class
intellectual production that thrived in France in the
1830s and 1840s in the wake of his break with Al-
thusser, turning Althusser’s privileging of scientific in-
sight over popular delusion on its head. As Hallward
(2006, 109) points out, Rancie`re’s writings consistently
explore the presumption that everyone shares equal
power of speech and thought. Yet, as I have suggested,
these historical cases as they appear in his later the-
oretical writings stop short of working through the
consequences of a staging of equality for the relation
between the order of the police and the part that has
no part. The reasons for this are doubtless multiple
and complex, but I have focused attention here on one
specific aspect of that larger problem. In considering
his conception of subjectivity and the difficult relation
between subjectification and disidentification, I have
suggested that the latter is still a form of identification,
and that it is necessary to move beyond identification
understood as a (negative) distancing to address the
mechanisms of the egalitarian inscription.
Egalitarian inscription, if it is to mean anything be-
yond the singular instance, needs to be enacted and
conceptualized in a way that makes it possible not only
tomaintain the insights specific to it, but to extend their
reach and impact to a wider domain. Conceptualizing
egalitarian inscription in this way can be achieved by
thinking more carefully about the role of the exem-
plar in the constitution of alternative political horizons.
Rancie`re’s own historical cases, I have suggested, could
be conceived of as exemplars, which would then open
up the analysis to consider the work of exemplars in
relation to awider audience—those occupying places in
the extant order—and of their responses to the theatre
of egalitarian inscription. Such an account is only possi-
ble once one problematizes the sharp division between
the police order and the moment of politics. Think-
ing of egalitarian inscription as a moment of bringing
the universal into play comes at the price of giving up
that sharp division. However, this is not something that
should be lamented, for the rethinking of the relation
radically opens up the police order for contestation and
politicization.
If, finally, one thinks of democracy not as a disrup-
tion occurring in rare instances and on the margins of
society, but as an aversive practice that could occur
anywhere and with consequences for how we think
of political community everywhere, it is possible to
foreground the central role of responsiveness to such
practices. This is not an optional luxury that we can
afford to add as an afterthought. It is, rather, a central
aspect of democratic subjectivity and practice, without
which, in Rancie`re’s own terms, “writing a name in the
sky” loses its ability to reconfigure the division of the
sensible. This reconfiguration has the potential to dis-
solve the extra-ordinary/ordinary division, the dualism
that holds much of democratic theory captive, for it
provides us with the resources to enjoy the fruits of
democratic vitality, yet without too quickly subordi-
nating these energies to legal and institutional proce-
dures. In addition, and this is perhaps its most crucial
contribution, it emphasizes the positive, critical, and
energizing role of moments of staging a wrong for the
extant order. As so many of our contemporary strug-
gles attest, moments of challenge and critique, of the
staging of democratic demands, are not important only
because they make us aware of and demand that we
address existing wrongs. They also are crucial to the
deepening and sustaining of a democratic ethos, an
ethos that foregrounds democratic responsiveness. The
“nextness” that for Cavell characterizes our subjectiv-
ity allows us to think of interruption and inscription
as ongoing possibilities that place serious normative
demands upon democratic orders.
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